On Windows, persistence is achieved by creating a hidden batch file (%PROGRAMDATA%system.bat) and adding a new entry named MicrosoftUpdate to HKCU:SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun to launch it at logon.
WAVESHAPER.V2 acts as a fully functional RAT with the following capabilities:
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Reconnaissance: Extracts system telemetry, including hostname, username, boot time, time zone, OS version, and detailed running process lists.
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Command Execution: Supports multiple execution methods, including in-memory Portable Executable (PE) injection and arbitrary shell commands. The shell execution command expects a script and script parameters from C2; if no script is provided, the parameter is executed as a PowerShell command, but if a script is provided, it is either Base64-encoded or placed into a file depending on its size.
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File System Enumeration: Returns detailed metadata for requested target directories by continuously recursing through the file system.
Attribution
GTIG attributes this activity to UNC1069, a financially motivated North Korea-nexus threat actor active since 2018. Analysis of the C2 infrastructure (sfrclak[.]com resolving to 142.11.206.73) revealed connections from a specific AstrillVPN node previously used by UNC1069. Additionally, adjacent infrastructure hosted on the same ASN has been historically linked to UNC1069 operations.
Furthermore, WAVESHAPER.V2 is a direct evolution of WAVESHAPER, a macOS and Linux backdoor previously attributed to UNC1069. While the original WAVESHAPER uses a lightweight, raw binary C2 protocol and employs code packing, WAVESHAPER.V2 communicates using JSON, collects additional system information, and supports more backdoor commands. Despite these upgrades, both versions accept their C2 URL dynamically via command-line arguments, share identical C2 polling behaviors and an uncommon User-Agent string, and deploy secondary payloads to identical temporary directories (e.g., /Library/Caches/com.apple.act.mond).
Outlook and Implications
The impact of this attack by North Korea-nexus actors is broad and has ripple effects as other popular packages rely on axios as a dependency. Notably, UNC1069 isn’t the only threat actor that has launched successful open source supply chain attacks in recent weeks. UNC6780 (also known as TeamPCP) recently poisoned GitHub Actions and PyPI packages associated with projects like Trivy, Checkmarx, and LiteLLM to deploy the SANDCLOCK credential stealer and facilitate follow-on extortion operations.
Hundreds of thousands of stolen secrets could potentially be circulating as a result of these recent attacks. This could enable further software supply chain attacks, software as a service (SaaS) environment compromises (leading to downstream customer compromises), ransomware and extortion events, and cryptocurrency theft over the near term.
Supply chain compromise is a particularly dangerous tactic because it abuses the inherent trust that users and enterprise administrators place in hardware, software, and updates supplied by reputable vendors as well as the trust they may not realize they are placing in collaborative code-sharing communities. Defenders should pay close attention to these campaigns, and enterprises should initiate dedicated efforts to assess the existing impact, remediate compromised systems, and harden environments against future attacks.
Remediation
GTIG urges all developers and organizations using the axios package to take immediate corrective action. Priority should be given to auditing dependency trees for compromised versions, isolating affected hosts, and rotating any potentially exposed secrets or credentials. Following initial containment, organizations must implement long-term hardening through strict version pinning and enhanced supply-chain monitoring.
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Version Control: Do not upgrade to axios version 1.14.1 or 0.30.4. Ensure corporate-managed NPM repositories are configured to serve only known-good versions (e.g., 1.14.0 or earlier; 0.30.3 or earlier).
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Dependency Pinning: Pin axios to a known safe version in your package-lock.json to prevent accidental upgrades.
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Malicious Package Audit: Inspect project lockfiles specifically for the ‘plain-crypto-js’ package (versions 4.2.0 or 4.2.1). Use tools like Wiz or Open Source Insights for deeper dependency auditing.
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Pipeline Security: Pause CI/CD deployments for any package relying on axios. Validate that builds are not pulling “latest” versions before redeploying with pinned, safe versions.
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Incident Response: If plain-crypto-js is detected, assume the host environment is compromised. Revert the environment to a known-good state and rotate all credentials or secrets present on that machine.
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Network Defense: Block all traffic to sfrclak[.]com and the command & control IP: 142.11.206.73. Monitor and alert on any endpoint communication attempts to this domain.
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Cache Remediation: Clear local and shared npm, yarn, and pnpm caches on all workstations and build servers to prevent re-infection during subsequent installs.
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Endpoint Protection: Deploy EDR to protect developer environments. Monitor for suspicious processes spawning from Node.js applications that match known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).
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Credential Management: Rotate all tokens and API keys used by applications confirmed to have run indicators of compromise (IOCs).
- Developer Sandboxing & Secret Vaulting: Isolate development environments in containers or sandboxes to restrict host filesystem access, and migrate plaintext secrets to the OS keychain using aws-vault. This ensures compromised packages cannot programmatically scrape credentials or execute malicious scripts directly on the host machine.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
To assist the wider community in hunting and identifying the activity outlined in this blog post, we have included IOCs in a free GTI Collection for registered users.
